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1. THE CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY 
The challenge of incorporating new developments in manufacturing technology 
into manufacturing strategy can be seen as the laying down of a series of major 
challenges to conventional manufacturing thinking: 
1. Reduce Work in Process by 500/b or more 
2. Reduce lead times by 50% or more 
3. Facilitate the introduction of new products a two to three times the 
existing rate on half the current design/development lead times. 
4. Reduce “support” labour by 50% or more 
It is not enough to think of mere “tinkering” with existing systems and 
technologies, such radical changes require a totally novel approach. Yet such an 
approach is perfectly feasible if one examines the current “norms” for 
manufacturing in most engineering companies, even those with relatively high 
volume final assembly processes. The normal conditions are: 
Bought out content 50% 
Throughput efficiency in component manufacturing, that is the ratio of 
work content to total lead time of 20%(or 80% of the time queuing or 
idle) 
Throughput efficiency relatively high in final assembly. 
Additionally we need to recognise: extensive periods in materials stores, 
finished component stores and often finished goods stores. 
Any approach which can reduce the “idle” time spent in the system will in fact 
achieve the first three objectives automatically and is likely to make labour 
reductions far easier to accomplish. However, instead of concerning itself with 
the “idle” portions of time productivity, most Western management seems to have 
been concerned with the (much smaller) “busy” periods, that is with concentration 
on the actual work task. While this is clearly not to be ignored it seems to have 
been a case of not seeing the wood for the trees. 
2. SOME ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO IMPROVING TIME 
PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING 
2.1. The Japanese (Just-in-Time) Approach 
This involves tight control over the flow of orders through the system to 
maintain very low queues. It requires considerable delegation to 
operators, a very directed application of manufacturing engineering to 
reduce set-up time and high levels of commitment to continuous and 
relatively constant production. Even the Japanese have only been able to 
apply this approach in a limited range of industrial environments but 
these have shown major benefits. 
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A European version of this courage + control + people-power approach 
can be seen in the application of Group Technology principles, which 
incidentally are very much the current vogue in the U.S. despite their 
relatively unfashionable image in the U.K. 
2.2. The Svstems Intensive ADDroach 
The more usual Western approach has been through sophisticated data 
processing systems in order to “solve” the manufacturing problem. This 
involves extensive data collection and daily scheduling of every operation. 
While this approach seems to have been more broadly applicable than the 
JIT approach, its effects have been far less dramatic: a move from “one 
operation per week” to two or three operations per week” is certainly an 
advantage but it may still mean only say 10 hours work in a 40 hour 
week, a throughput efficiency of only 25%. 
2.3. The CaDital Intensive ADDroach 
The use of capital investment in high technology manufacturing 
equipment in order to effect time productivity is not new. It started with 
multi-axis machining centres and other multi-operation machines, the 
objective being to reduce the number of operations, the ultimate- aim 
being one operation per part. Too often, however, the promise was 
unfulfilled because although 10 components of a 100 component assembly 
were produced in 4 weeks instead of 14 the other 90 still took 14 with no 
effect on the customer lead time. Alternatively, the planners went 
overboard in putting as many components as possible on such machines 
only to generate bottlenecks ahead of them. The successful application of 
the capital intensive approach requires a plant wide view to be taken and 
careful planning of capacity. 
2.4. The Time Intensive ADDroach 
This simple approach has often been neglected; multi-shift operation is a 
very effective method for shortening the total elapsed lead time, since 
throughput efficiency relates hours of work to available hours. Thus at 
an efficiency of 25%, 100 hours work would take 10 weeks at 40 hours 
per week but only 5 weeks at 80 hours per week on a 2 shift basis. 
The likely impact of the newest manufacturing technologies can best be understood by 
seeing them as providing the vehicle through which all of the four fundamental 
approaches described above can be implemented simultaneously: 
(a> Just-in-time production is made possible through few operations, tight 
deterministic’scheduling and minimum tool change times. 
(b) Again because of the high level of predictability obtained and the 
reduction in lot sizes close coordination of component requirements is not 
only necessary but is also significantly facilitated. 
Cc) The solution is clearly part of the capital intensive approach but it is 
important to re-emphasise the point that it must be a plant wide view 
that is taken in the overall system design. 
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(4 Multiple (unmanned) shift operation becomes a reality. 
COMPUTER INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING 
The complete CIM model includes at least the following major modules: 
3.1. 
3.2. 
3.3. 
3.4. 
3.5. 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
This includes the production of schematic drawings and detail 
dimensioning and may include finite element analysis and simulation 
capabilities. 
Computer Aided Production Ennineerinq (CAPE) 
The CAPE module in general accepts data from the CAD module and 
from this process routings, operation lists and times can be produced. In 
addition it will normally include provision for tooling and the design of 
jigs and fixtures. CAPE would also usually produce the necessary 
computer control instructions/tapes for both manufacturing machines and 
test equipment. 
Computer Aided Production Planning (CAPP) . 
The CAPP module is probably the most familiar and has been around for 
some time in the form of computer scheduling systems. CAPP takes 
inputs from CAPE and the order acceptance systems and using its own 
basic data carries out load and capacity planning and detailed scheduling. 
Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) 
Although, used in a general sense this may include everything except 
CAD, it is convenient to regard the CAM module as only carrying out 
those activities directly related to machining processes. CAM therefore 
operates the production machines and carries out real time job 
sequencing. 
Computer Aided Storage and Transport (CAST) 
The final basic module is concerned with materials handing. This may 
include warehousing, automatic stock picking systems and materials 
conveyancing. It would also control any Automatic Guided Vehicles 
(AGV’s) used within the manufacturing system. 
The basic links between these modules are illustrated in Figure 1. 
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4. NEW TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT IN THE U.K, 
In a recent survey of U.K. manufacturing operations (New 1986), plants were 
questioned concerning their current and future plans relating to investments in 
_ the new manufacturing technologies. 
For many of the plants the perceived payoffs to date from new technology seem 
to have been low or even non-existent. While this in itself should not be 
surprising what is more worrying is that the failure to obtain short term results 
may be discouraging companies from pursuing these technologies further. If this 
view is carried through it spells disaster for the U.K. economy in the long run. 
The 240 sample plants included 155 in engineering and related -activities - the 
obvious major users of much of the available new technology. However, of the 
64 plants reporting experimentation with Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) 
technology, two-thirds reported low or negative payoff to date. Of the 69 
experimenting with Robotics over three-quarters reported low or negative payoff. 
Taking CAD and CAM (Computer Aided Design and Manufacture) together, 
while two thirds of the companies who could possibly make good use of the 
technologies did in fact report using them, almost half did not think they had 
made any significant gains from their introduction, Tables 1 and 2 show for 
comparison the plants’ ranking of the specified technologies on the basis of 
payoff to date and future emphasis. 
In relation to planned future emphasis the results do appear to be slightly 
disturbing. Less than half the respondents intended to put high or even fairly 
high emphasis on CAD/CAM and this proportion dropped to 25% for FMS and a 
meagre 15% for Robotics - in fact around one in three reported NO emphasis on 
the latter two. Only the computerised production planning and control 
technology represented by MRP showed any real payoff to date or indication of 
extensive future emphasis: 56% of plants reported fairly high or high payoffs 
already and 79% intended putting that level of effort behind such systems over 
the next two years - good news for the computer companies and software houses. 
The slightly encouraging side of the results is seen best from Table 3 which 
shows that there is at least a fairly dramatic increase in the number of plants 
intending to pick up the new technologies over the next 2 years. For example 
while only 64 plants reported themselves as using FMS technology to date, 115 
reported some future emphasis (that is ranking its importance above ‘none’) 
indicating a 79% increase in take up. Similar increases are apparent for the other 
technologies. The technique showing the least percentage increase, MRP, was 
already being widely used. 
4.1 Competitive Priorities 
. 
In terms of competitive strategy in the marketplace the current ranking of 
the ‘competitive edge’ criteria planned by the U.K respondents is shown 
in Table 4. The degree of importance apparently attached to the top 
ranking items: consistent quality and dependable delivery is impressive. 
Almost three quarters of respondents ranked consistent quality as ‘high’, 
rising to 97% ranking it fairly high or high. Similarly 58O/6 ranked 
dependable delivery as of high importance rising to 92% fairly high or 
high. There is of course some element of “motherhood” in such results - 
no one is likely to say such things are unimportant. However, if we 
compare the U.K results with those from the European Futures Study 
(Ferdows. 1985) and from the North American Manufacturing Futures 
Survey (Miller and Vollman 1985) as shown in Figure 2. some interesting 
comparisons emerge. 
The similarities are not surprising: consistent quality is clearly a number 
one priority in the U.K as it is in the U.S.A as it is in Europe. In 
second place for the U.K and the U.S.A comes dependable delivery, but 
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for the European sample as a whole the ability to produ>:Mh-,-- 
performance products was ranked higher than dependable delivery in 
1983 and 1985 and equal with it in 1984. In fact as can be seen clearly 
in Figure 2 the U.K rankings in absolute terms tended to be higher than 
for the U.S. or European sample except in two directly related areas: the 
ability to produce high performance products and even more markedly 
the ability to implement rapid product design changes. For the U.K. 
sample the ability to produce at low cost ranked higher than the ability to 
produce high performance products whereas in every case for the 
European surveys and for the U.S. this ranking was reversed. 
This is a strange and worrying finding for a sample heavily biased 
towards the U.K. exporting industries. The emphasis in U.K. 
manufacturing is still apparently seen to be on the production of fairly 
standard products at low costs. It is clear that the developed economies 
of Europe are much more concerned with the rapid introduction of new 
high performance products than with low cost production - and this is 
almost certainly the only viable long term strategy for a highly developed 
economy. To be fair this trend was more marked in the consumer and 
intermediate product plants than in those producing capital equipment: 
while 74% of all plants rated low costs ‘fairly high’ or ‘high’ only 63% of 
the plants producing capital goods did. 
The other striking feature of Figure 2 is the difference in the rating 
assigned to ‘after sales service’ between the U:K. and U.S. plants who 
rated it fairly important and the European plants who generally ranked it 
below any of the other criteria. Does this indicate a competitive 
weakness of European companies ? This could possibly be exploited by 
U.K. manufacturers who are clearly aware of this factor’s crucial 
importance, particularly in the capital goods field. In fact in the U.K. 
survey four out of five plants in the capital goods sector rated after sales 
service at the fairly high/high level. 
One could perhaps argue that with less emphasis on new product 
development and design flexibility the U.K. plants perceive less of a 
requirement for some of the new technologies. However, some of the 
most important potential benefits to be gained from CAM, Robotics and 
FMS are likely to be in the areas of quality and delivery reliability, so 
this argument seems to be difficult to support in practice. 
Returning to delivery reliability, it is clear that the plants all rated the 
ability to deliver on time to quoted delivery dates as a major competitive 
factor. Yet the reported delivery performance of the participating plants 
was actually fairly poor: almost one in four plants reported delivering less 
than half of their customers’ orders on time. Setting a very modest target 
of “75% or better on time delivery” only 46% of the plants achieved this. 
Moreover, the proportions as we have seen are remarkably consistent 
between 1975 and 1985, in 1975 only 44% of plants achieved an on-time 
delivery target of 80% or better - plus ca change c’est la meme chose! 
Again, in 1975 400/o of plants reported that they had no formal system for 
measuring performance against promised delivery dates and this figure 
appears if anything to have gone up (to 46%) rather than down. 
The situation which seems to emerge is one of ‘lip service’ to delivery 
reliability: the plants almost unanimously rate it as important but: one in 
four plants deliver more orders late than on time and the median plant in 
the sample delivers one order in every four after its originally quoted 
delivery date. Finally only about half the plants even bother to monitor 
their actual delivery performance. The strategy is good, the tactics 
simply don’t deliver. 
5. REASONS FOR THE U.K. INVESTMENT FAILURE 
It is clear from the survey results reported above that there is a reluctance in the 
U.K. to invest even in the ‘Islands of Technology’ and consequently even more 
reluctance to move towards CIM. 
If we consider a typical FMS capital expenditure proposal it is not hard to 
understand the reluctance of management to take up such investment: 
Number of 
Machines 
Conventional 
, 68 
FMS Difference 
18 -78% 
Number of 
Operators 
Floor space M2 
215 12 -94% 
9750 3000 -69% 
Lead time (days) 80 3 -96% 
This all looks very impressive and certainly from a labour productivity point of 
view it k. However, when we examine the expenditure requirements we find 
that the FMS requires something like an additional f 13million up front capital 
investment and shows savings of the order of: 
One off (Inventory reduction) 
Annual (labour savings) 
f2.8m 
fl.Om 
The result? 
A DCF rate of return of less than 10% and a Payback period of 10 years. For a 
project which requires main board approval this is clearly an unlikely 
proposition. 
The bald outline figures of this proposal provide all the clues as to whv such 
investments appear unattractive and why U.K. management in particular have 
been slow in putting money into radically new technologies. Let us examine each 
of these in turn. 
5.1. Inadeauate Tools of Financial Analvsis 
(a) yse of Excessivelv HiPh Hurdle Rates or Short 
Pav-Back Period8 
Typically, companies require applicants for investment funds to 
produce a detailed DCF analysis for the proposed project and to 
submit this for consideration alongside other proposals. A ‘hurdle’ 
rate is established by the controlling function (usually the financial 
controller or accountant) and projects not getting over the hurdle 
are re jetted. A less sophisticated management might require 
payback within a given time. 
On the assumption (not necessarily true but not for discussion 
here) that capital is in short supply, management tend to set high 
hurdle rates in order to ‘allocate’ the available funds - to high 
return projects. Such hurdle rates are often of the order of 15 - 
30% and may reflect the current return on assets being achieved. 
Technically there are a number of problems with this approach. 
The major weakness is that a company’s true hurdle rate is in fact 
its marginal oppportunity cost of capital - in other words the real 
rate of return which could be obtained by investing the money in 
something else. This long term rate is around 8 - 10% NOT 15 - 
30%. Moreover the problem is compounded by setting a high 
discount rate (which includes inflation) but using constant ;‘s in 
the cash flow projections - a practice which is of course totally 
inconsistent. Such errors, even assuming the cash flow projections 
are complete, introduce a heavy bias against all forms of advanced 
technology investment because of: 
Long start-up periods 
Long project lives 
Delayed returns 
Similar conditions apply in the case of short pay-back periods. 
How can an FMS which will take up to 2 years to fully implement 
pay back within 3 years from start-up - which actually implies a 
payback closer to one year. 
The return on current assets is often used as the basis for the 
hurdle rate on the reasoning that any investment which does not 
show this return will dilute current return on assets. This is 
certainly true but is also irrelevant. If a company is making say 
30% return on flM of assets and invests a further f 100,000 at say 
lo%, its return on assets will drop to 28% but if in order to do 
this it borrowed the flOO,OOO at a & cost of say 7% it is now 
making 10,000 - 7,000 = f3,OOO extra profit per annum. In other 
words companies give up extra profit in order to maintain an 
artifically high return on assets. In any case the main reasons for 
such returns is nothing to do with the profit being earned but 
rather with the low valuation of the current asset base. 
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(b) Use of Inanorooriate Alternative Investment 
Assumotions 
In preparing an investment proposal for new technologies it is 
often the case that the ‘do nothing’ option assumes future 
conditions of stable market share, selling prices and costs. Such 
assumptions clearly fail to take account of possible competitive 
action. If any one competitor in the market does make such new 
investment, over time such assumptions are unlikely to remain 
true. In most cases the new technologies provide a substantially 
lower marginal unit cost. In order to achieve a better return on 
the initial investment a competitor using the new technology is 
likely to use such cost advantage to increase market share. 
It is obvious that such status-quo assumptions make new 
technology investment look less attractive. The true base-case 
comparison should probably be falling market share, falling sales 
and rising unit costs. 
In the same way comparison of new technology investment with 
‘like-for-like’ replacement often assumes an inappropriate life the 
* the ‘old’ technology. Flexible manufacturing systems by their 
nature may be flexed to meet changing product requirements. 
Traditional forms of often product specific investment may have 
their true life limited by product changes - this is of course 
particularly important for high volume manufacturing businesses. 
We have already discussed the use of high cut-off or hurdle rates 
but we should repeat again the fact that using a hurdle rate of 
30% implies that there are alternative investment opportunities 
available which do give a & rate of return of 30%, this is simply 
not true. 
(cl Bias Towards Incremental Investment 
In most companies the Capital Expenditure proposal system is set 
up around authorisation levels: up to f 10,000 might require 
department head approval, f30,OOO plant manager approval and so 
on. It is therefore not uncommon to see clusters of proposals 
which manage to come in just below the established ceilings. This 
practice sets arbitrary limits on incremental investments and forces 
many junior managers (who raise the proposals) to think only in 
terms of such incremental investments. 
It may well be that each incremental investment may aooarentlv 
be justified in its own right, the problem is that added together 
the increments actually cause dysynergy and are certainly not as 
effective as a total innovation could have been. It is also not 
uncommon to discover that if, for example, all the inventory 
reductions claimed for each incremental investment were added up 
the company would have a negative inventory! As much post- 
investment auditing often shows the savings claimed in order to 
meet high hurdle rates simply do not materialise in practice. 
Perhaps an even worse consequence for the company is that the 
existence of a whole set of ongoing incremental investments 
actually precludes consideration of revolutionary investment 
proposals. At any point in time there are a number of 
investments whose benefits are still outstanding and to abandon 
them in favour of a radical change clearly indicates that such 
investments should not have been started - that is an admission of 
error by the managers concerned. The correct strategy would 
appear to be to assess the technological life of the existing plant 
and only accept investments which show a return within that 
period - say 3 years. The intention of course being to replace the 
existing plant with a radically new technology at that time. Is that 
what U.K. plants are currently doing with their short payback 
requirements? Do they really intend to scrap their existing plants 
in 3 years anyway ? I wish I believed that that were true. 
Cd) Failure to Include all TanPible Benefits 
Typically investment proposals have included only the most 
obvious of the tangible benefits expected and only those which it 
has been possible to quantify easily. As it happens this did not 
matter very much before the advent of CAM/FMS systems simply 
because the changes were not dramatic enou h. 
machine requires say 25 M2 instead of 30 M f 
If a new 
the cost of the 
factory space was hardly very relevant. With FMS type systems. 
however, we are talking of space reductions of the order of 70% 
and inventory reductions of a similar order - these offer very real 
opportunities for cost reduction. 
The tangible benefits which need to be accounted for certainly 
include: 
INVENTORY REDUCTIONS in terms of investment 
savings and space and warehousing costs. 
FLOOR SPACE REDUCTIONS taking into account the 
true opportunity cost of new space and such items as 
heating/lighting etc. 
QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS, including the benefits of 
process repeatability and monitoring, waste reduction, 
inspection reduction and reduced warranty payments to 
customers. 
WAGE INFLATION PROTECTION, the far lower number 
of people involved in running the new technologies clearly 
provides considerable protection against general wage 
inflation. In a sense the plant is able to ‘freeze’ much of 
its unit cost through the capital investment. This need not, 
however, be seen as exchanging variable (labour) cost for 
fixed (machine) cost because these concepts become 
irrelevant: in practice much labour cost has become fixed 
and different depreciation policies which relate to output 
volume rather than simple passage of time make much 
more sense for the new technologies. 
HIGHER EQUIPMENT UTILISATION even when fairly 
substantial increases in downtime are allowed for technical 
problems the new manufacturing technologies can still 
provide dramatic increases in & utilisation through 
unmanned operation and flexible scheduling. 
(4 Failure to Include Soft or Tntannible Benefits 
Even when all the possible tangible benefits are included in the 
analysis there are still a lot of extremely important factors which 
remain unaccounted for: 
1. Higher market penetration due to Short Reliable lead 
times. 
2. Schedule dependability due to deterministic scheduling. 
3. The learning curve benefits which can only come from 
adoption of the technology. 
4. The volume flexibility in terms of output for the market 
which is possible through the use of unmanned operation. 
5. Labour stability because of volume flexibility with a given 
labour force. 
6. Product flexibility to move quickly as the market changes. 
Most of these characteristics are revenue enhancing rather than COST 
reducing and for this reason are regarded, particularly by accountants, as 
highly subjective and therefore of dubious value in the analysis. It seems 
to be much easier to accept the idea of a 10% cost reduction based on a 
well established and detailed cost statement than the nebulous idea of a 
market share increase due to better delivery performance. It is obviously 
difficult to value such benefits but that does not make it correct to 
assume that they are all zero! The trouble with much traditional 
‘accounting is that it prefers precision to accuracv, it would rather be 
precisely wrong than vaguely correct. One useful way of including such 
factors in the analysis is to establish what the annual return from such 
soft benefits would need to be in order to reach the required hurdle rate 
and then ask “is this a feasible value to put on such soft benefits?” 
5.2. The Management Communication GaD 
The gap in communication between manufacturing engineering and senior 
management has always been a problem but the new technologies have 
brought this to a new level of significance. To be fair senior 
management have been right to be sceptical in the past and their faith has 
hardly been restored by the failed promises of the benefits from 
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individual machining centres put into traditional environments. What is 
needed today is manufacturing engineers with vision and a wide market 
perspective who are not afraid to raise capital expenditure proposals for 
figures 10 or even 20 times the corporate norm. On the management side 
too we need a long term perspective, a commitment to major changes in 
organisational structure and the will to make it work. 
There are usually three clearly identified management groups in many 
companies faced with the new technologies: 
SENIOR MANAGEMENT, they know it is necessary to do 
something for strategic reasons and they are worried about what 
the foreign competitors are doing. 
JUNIOR MANUFACTURING ENGINEERS, they (if trained 
properly) know the technologies and have the expertise but they 
have little influence and find it difficult to relate to the 
competitive strategy of the business. 
MIDDLE MANUFACTURING MANAGEMENT, who, too often, 
do not know the technologies and feel uncomfortable about them 
and who in any case are being measured on short term results. 
The existence of these three different positions often leads to considerable 
frustration for both senior management and the manufacturing engineers 
and considerable stonewalling by manufacturing management. 
5.3. Risk Aversion and the Fear of Failure 
Most European and particularly most UK managers suffer from a severe 
form of risk aversion. The reasons for this are complex and cultural but 
the underlying problem is fear of failure on the part of the individual. 
In the United States it is readily accepted that if you try lots of 
innovation some of it will fail but there need be no stigma attached to the 
individual managers involved in the failure (unless it is clearly caused by 
incompetence or mismanagement) - it is better to have .tried and failed 
than not to have tried at all. In Japan individuals are perceived to be 
carrying through a consensus decision so that failure (or success) is shared 
by all and again no stigma attaches to the individual. In the UK 
however, two factors seem to govern many aspects of managerial 
behaviour particularly in manufacturing: 
(a> Most managers see themselves as being in their current job for a 
very limited time span (2 - 3 years). 
lb) Visible failure in their current position will prevent further 
progression whereas visible success will guarantee their onward 
progression in the organisation. 
The snag with having these two factors together is obvious - it leads to 
short term decision making and strong risk aversion, 
Of course there will be difficulties with implementing new technologies, 
of course there will be teething troubles and loss of output and of course 
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there will be extra costs not known at the start of the projects. However, 
how many new investments can you think of that have not eventually met 
most of the initial objectives? Even though individual managers may 
only be in place for a relatively short period the organisation is intended 
to continue indefinitely - new technology is a long term commitment. 
A manufacturing manager investing substantially in new technology raises 
his asset base, lowers his return on assets and under current accounting 
conventions raises his fixed cost - small wonder so few are keen to do it 
when they are measured on annual performance. 
Perhaps the most relevant insight here is a general failure to differentiate 
between ‘sins of commission’ and ‘sins of omission’. A manager is 
responsible for a sin of commission if he;she does something which turns 
out in retrospect to be an error - this is to be expected occasionally if the 
manager is operating in an innovative way. Sins of commision are 
therefore unfortunate but should hardly be penalised unless regularly 
repeated. By comparison a manager is responsible for a sin of omission if 
something goes wrong as a result of something the manager did not do 
(but by implication should have done). This is serious and shouid be 
strongly penalised in terms of future career progression - it implies that 
the manager is failing to exert proper custodial control over the business. 
Applied to the area of new technology investment this-idea has much to 
commend it. It is clearly possible ( even inevitable) to commit sins of 
commission. It is, however, absolutely certain that the do nothing option 
will in most cases be a serious sin of omission. 
6. FROM ISLANDS OF TECHNOLOGY TO CIM 
If, as we have discussed, there are considerable barriers to investment in the 
individual islands of technology there are even more barriers to integrating the 
islands together to achieve a CIM environment. In justifying a CAD investment, 
for example, the design office may do this based on such benefits as design 
productivity, component standardisation etc. In justifying a CNC machine the 
manufacturing manager may do this on cost reduction, inventory reduction and 
better quality. Each of these investments may apparently increase productivity in 
their own area but the real question is whether the business as a whole is actually 
better off. One useful analogy to illustrate this is to imagine the business as a 
fluid flowing through a pipe (Figure 3). We started with a 2” diameter pipe and 
an appropriate flow level. The CAD investment expanded the diameter of the 
pipe in design to 4”, the CAM investment expanded the diameter in component 
machining to 4” and similarly a new CAPP (MRPII) system was installed which 
made it possible to double productivity in planning and control - to a 4” pipe. 
The snag? The CAD interface with the CAM systems still created a bottleneck 
of a 2” pipe and similarly information availability between the CAM system and 
production control still restricted flow to a 2” pipe. The result - no real benefit 
to the business as a whole. 
My recurring nightmare of lack of system integration is a designer using a CAD 
system to produce new drawings (twice as fast as he used to) so that he can fling 
them ‘over the wall’ into manufacturing that much faster. When they arrive in 
manufacturing the manufacturing planning engineer’s first task is to feed back 
into his computer all the necessary data from the drawing in order to use his own 
CAPE system. This of course prints out operation lists and possibly Bills-of- 
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Material which he posts to the production control department and tooling and 
fixture requirements which he posts to the tool drawing office. Production 
control enter the operations lists into their routing file (for CAPP) and the BOMS 
into their product structure file. The tool drawing office of course use a 
different CAD system chosen by the Chief tool designer and so re-enter the 
detail part co-ordinates before commencing tool design. Meanwhile the CNC 
programmers are of course preparing from scratch the machine tapes needed for 
CAM and the plant engineers are similarly transferring the data into the 
automatic warehousing system which uses customer identification numbers 
instead of the internal part number. 
The dream is of an integrated set of systems each able to operate independently 
but each able to draw off or supply appropriate interface data at the touch of a 
button. 
There are, however, two very real and very distinct barriers to such integration; 
one technical and the other behavioural. 
6.1. The Technical ,Problem 
I am (I think reliably) informed that - given time, expertise and money - 
you can in software terms interface anything with anything. In fact 
despite all the (to me largely incomprehensible) technical problems the 
basic requirement is quite straightforward. Each island of technology’ 
needs a ‘mailboat’ package of data to be transferred between islands - the 
difficulty comes of course in specifying the data package in the first 
place having transport which is suitable and arranging for a frequency of 
service which matches the needs of the organisation. The resulting 
‘integration’ more often than not takes the form of Figure 4 with various 
methods of transfer ranging from the”daily ferry service” through the “DP 
highwire Act” to the “stepping stones only useable at low tide”. 
The technical problem is non-trivial and there are any number of cases in 
which a design office has invested in a particular CAD system in order to 
improve design productivity only to discover that appropriate post- 
processors were not always available to enable direct links with CAM. 
If the technical problem is daunting the behavioural problem is even 
worse. 
6.2. The Behavioural Problem or “KeeD off mv Patch” 
The behavioural problem is that the integration of the systems described 
requires a correspondingly integrated approach from management. Design 
engineers can no longer sit in splendid isolation is the drawing office and 
fling designs ‘over the wall’ into manufacturing without regard to 
available tooling, machine capability or capacity. Design, operation 
planning, machine choice and capacity planning are strongly interrelated 
and the “design to production” transfer a continuous (and interactive) 
process. The key point, however, is that optimisation of the whole 
process is unlikely to come from optimisation of the individual islands of 
technology - the individual functional managers cannot be allowed to run 
their own show as if the other areas did not matter. In practice this 
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7. 
means that there will be limits on system choice placed on the individual 
areas in order to enable overal integration to be achieved. There are a 
number of possible ways in which this problem can be tackled and we 
return to these below. 
ACTION PLAN FOR MANAGEMENT 
It is always dangerous to recommend ‘global’ action plans but from our 
discussions a number of clear points do emerge and it is appropriate to 
summarise these here under a number of headings. 
7.1. Maior Changes in Financial Evaluation Procedures 
Realistic hurdle rates (8%) 
- high for fix-its 
- low for long term high-tech 
- premium for ‘as-is’ technology 
. * Include all tangible benefits 
Allow for intangible benefits: 
use ‘hurdle’ annual benefit requirements 
needed to make investment worthwhile 
Compare with realistic alternatives assuming 
competitive action 
Top down authorisation - abandon ceilings? 
7.2 Set-Up Strategic Technolonv Teams 
Senior Management 
Middle Manufacturing Management 
Technically qualified Manufacturing Engineers 
Technically qualified Information Technologists 
Engineering Designers 
to address the problem “Given that with no action we will cease to be 
competitive, what bundle of investments will maximise competitiveness 
on the following dimensions . ..’ 
To answer such a question the team will clearly also require inputs from 
marketing and product development. 
7.3. Initiate a Maior Education and Training Proaramme 
For - Senior 
Middle 
Supervisory Management 
Accountants 
Financial Controllers 
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7.4 
- Information Processing 
- Financial Justification of High-Tech Investment 
Incorporate Lona Term Straterries into Short Term 
Performance Measures 
Teething problems 
Productivity variances 
Indirect support costs 
Training costs 
7.5. Establish a Soecific Technoloav Input to the 
Manufacturing Strategy 
5 Year Manufacturing technology plan 
1,3,5 year implementation plans 
7.6 Oreanisational Structuring 
Creation of design to production (DTP) teams 
This is the major feature of most attempts to overcome the problems of 
organisational boundaries. Figure 5 illustrates three approaches which 
have been used: 
1. Specialist designers and DTP teams to take the basic design from 
concept to finished item. 
2. DTP teams which are product (or product group) specific but 
which can call on expert ‘staff help when necessary from 
consultant designers, manufacturing engineers or part 
programmers. 
and 3. Totally dedicated DTP teams by product group. This is a form 
probably most suitable to the larger company with few high 
volume product lines. 
In - Manufacturing Systems Engineering 
- Technologies 
8. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of transformation is there but it is necessary to see the new 
technologies as an opportunity not a threat. Consideration of whether to use the 
new technologies is no longer the issue. It is not an option but an obligation if 
the U.K. is to stay competitive in world markets. We are in danger not merely 
of falling behind in the competitive race but of dropping out of it altogether. 
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TABLE 1 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
PAYOFFS TO DATE 1985 SURVEY 
PAYOFF 
NEGATIVE MODERATE 
NONE OR TO HIGH 
LOW 
CAD 46% 54% 
CAM 46% 54% 
MRP 19% 81% 
FMS 67% 33% 
ROBOTS 76% 24% 
Ctanfield School of Reproduction of thisvlsual ad In an unaltered 
TABLE 2 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
FUTURE EMPHASIS: NEXT 2 YEARS 
CAD 
CAM 
MRP 
FMS 
ROBOTS 
NONE TO FAIRLY HIGH 
MODERATE OR HIGH 
54% 46% 
54% 46% 
21% 79% 
75% 25% 
85% 15% 
Cranfield School of Reproduction of this visual ald in an unaltered 
CAD 106 
CAM 102 
MRP 167 
FMS 64 
ROBOTS 69 
TABLE 3 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
GROWTH IN USER BASE 
NO. OF 
USER 
PLANTS 
NO. OF 
PLANTS 
INDICATING 
FUTURE USE 
167 
165 
217 
115 
111 
(TOTAL SAMPLE SIZE 240) 
% 
INCREASE 
57% 
62% 
30% 
79% 
61% 
Cranfield School of Reproduction of this visual ard in an unaltered 
.a-- ------ * 
TABLE 4 
COMPETITIVE PRIORITIES OF U.K. MANUFACTURING 
RANK 
1. CONSISTENT QUALITY 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
DEPENDABLE DELIVERY 
LOW COSTS 
HIGH PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 
AFTER SALES SERVICE 
6. FAST DELIVERIES 
7. RAPID PRODUCT DESIGN CHANGES 
/ w Cranfield School of Reoroduction of this wsual aid in an unaltered I 
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AND DTP TEAMS 
FIGURE 5 
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